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A key question of auction design is whether to use an ascending-bid or a sealed-bid format. The critical 
distinction between formats is that an ascending auction provides the bidders with information through 
the process of bidding. This information is a two-edged sword. It may stimulate competition by creating a 
reliable process of price discovery, by reducing the winner’s curse, and by allowing efficient aggregations 
of items. Alternatively, the information may be used by bidders to establish and enforce collusive 
outcomes. Ex ante asymmetries and weak competition favor a sealed-bid design. In other cases, an 
ascending auction is likely to perform better in efficiency and revenue terms. Moreover, information in an 
ascending auction can be tailored to limit collusion. 
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At an early conference on spectrum auctions, I remember sitting next to a professional auctioneer 
and asking him to compare auction formats. His reply was emphatic: “Every auctioneer knows that 
English [ascending] auctions raise the most revenue.” His confidence was a bit troubling in light of the 
ambiguous results in auction theory, and mixed results from experiments. Herein lies an attempt at 
explaining the virtues (and pitfalls) of ascending auctions in practice. 
With neither theory nor experiments providing definitive results, it is easy to conclude that which 
auction format is best is an empirical matter. How one would go about answering this empirical question 
is difficult at best, since rarely do we see multiple formats being used in easily comparable settings. 
Certainly, it is easy to think of instances where a particular format has done remarkably well in generating 
revenues. Consider, for instance, the Federal Communications Commission’s C-block ascending auction. 
It would be difficult to imagine that bids would have been higher under sealed bidding. Prices in that 
auction escalated to the point where bidders had to go back to investors with revised business plans that 
would justify the doubling of prices from an earlier auction. (Indeed, prices went so high that many 
winners are now unable to pay up.) On the other hand, BellSouth’s recent $2.5 billion bid for the premier 
license in Brazil’s sealed-bid cellular auction was $1 billion more than the next highest bid.
1 This bid of 
$139 per person was the highest price paid to date for a mobile phone license. BellSouth’s stock fell $1.25 
per share following the announcement of the outcome. It is hard to imagine that an ascending-bid format 
would have pushed the second-highest bidder (AT&T) above $2.5 billion.  
Ascending auctions have been used for thousands of years. Sotheby’s has relied on ascending 
auctions, since 1744, and Christie’s, since 1766. Surely if ascending auctions performed badly these 
institutions would have changed their ways. 
I begin by presenting the reasons why ascending auctions are so successful. Then I discuss reasons 
for using a sealed-bid auction. The final section discusses various ascending auctions for the sale of many 
items. 
I.  Why ascending bid? 
Auctions are fundamentally about allocating and pricing scarce resources in settings of uncertainty. 
Every auction asks and answers the basic question: who should get the items and at what prices? The 
popularity of an ascending auction stems from how well it answers this question. In an ascending auction, 
price and allocation are determined in an open competition among the bidders. The bidders willing to pay 
the most win and pay prices that no other bidders are willing to top. 
Ascending auctions provide a process of price discovery. Value is socially determined through the 
escalation of bids. Rarely does a bidder enter an auction with fixed values for the items being sold. Rather 
the bidders learn from each other’s bidding, adjusting valuations throughout the process. This process is 
especially important when resale is a possibility or more generally when others have information relevant 
to assessing the item’s value. This open competition gives ascending auctions a legitimacy that is not 
shared by other auctions. Throughout the auction, every bidder is given the opportunity to top the high 
bid. The auction ends when no bidder is willing to do so. The winner can say, “I won because I was 
willing to pay a bit more than the others.” Losers are given every opportunity to top the winning bid. 
Their loss stems solely from their failure to do so. 
                                                      
1 RCR, July 14, 1997, p. 1.   2
  The iterative price discovery in an ascending auction is most apt to generate reliable market prices. A 
sealed-bid auction forces the bidders to make guesses of the likely bids of the others. If these guesses are 
wrong, then the outcome may differ from what would result in a dynamic market. An ascending auction 
allows the learning needed to identify the intersection of supply and demand, and hence the market price. 
A.  Efficiency 
This price discovery process is the source of the chief virtue of ascending auctions: efficiency. In the 
single-good case, ascending auctions are efficient under general conditions. Efficiency does not rely on 
symmetry, private values, or other unrealistic assumptions.
2 Of course, Vickrey has shown in the private 
value setting how efficiency theoretically can be achieved by sealed-bid auctions. However, experiments 
demonstrate that ascending auctions perform better than Vickrey auctions, because the incentive for 
playing the efficient dominant strategy is clearer to bidders (Kagel et al. 1987). A bidder with a value of 
$10 can see plainly in an ascending auction that dropping out below $10 is a bad idea, as is bidding 
beyond $10. This strategic simplicity not only promotes efficiency, but also encourages participation, 
since fewer resources are needed to figure out how to bid. 
In auctions for multiple items, the efficiency question is more difficult and depends on which 
ascending auction is used, as I discuss later. The most natural format is the simultaneous ascending 
auction, used by the FCC in its spectrum auctions. In this auction, all items are on the block 
simultaneously. Bidders can raise their bids on any items and shift among items in response to price 
changes. This auction form makes a lot of sense for the sale of items with interdependent values. As the 
auction progresses, bidders get a better sense of final prices and assignments. This information is useful in 
deciding where to place bids. It allows efficient arbitrage across substitute items, and it improves chances 
that an efficient combination of complementary items will be obtained. Bidders can shift to better values 
as relative prices change, and can get a sense of whether it makes sense to go after a particular package of 
items. Of course, the process is imperfect, resulting in some inefficiency, but the dynamic price discovery 
goes a long way in realizing all gains from trade. On efficiency grounds it is hard not to recommend an 
ascending auction. 
B.  Revenue maximization 
Efficiency is only one goal of the seller. Revenue maximization is an important, if not the overriding, 
goal in many cases. Hence, it is important to evaluate auction formats in revenue terms. Fortunately, 
revenue and efficiency are often not in conflict. Ausubel and Cramton (1996) show that, when bidders 
have flat demand curves in a symmetric private-value setting, the seller maximizes revenue by awarding 
the items to those with the highest values. More generally, the seller can do better by making use of 
information it has about bidders’ values, and setting reserve prices and bidder-specific handicaps. 
However, such discriminatory practices are rarely acceptable and moreover the seller may not have useful 
information on the bidders’ values. It is precisely this uncertainty that is prompting the auction in the first 
place. Hence, in most practical settings, it is reasonable to restrict attention to auction formats that treat 
the bidders equally and do not rely on subjective information about valuations. 
The conflict between revenue maximization and efficiency is further reduced when one considers the 
desirable effects an efficient auction has on participation. Potential bidders are attracted to the auction 
based on the expected gains from participation. An efficient auction maximizes the gains from trade, 
which is the pie that is to be divided between seller and buyer. An attempt by the seller to extract 
additional revenues by setting a positive reserve discourages participation, which ultimately reduces 
revenues (Harstad 1990). 
                                                      
2 Ascending auctions may not be efficient in settings with multidimensional signals. For example, in a setting with 
both common and private value components, the bidder with the highest common-value signal may top the bidder 
with the highest private value.   3
Efficient auctions do especially well when we introduce the possibility of resale. Consider an 
independent private value setting in which resale leads to an efficient assignment. By the Revenue 
Equivalence Theorem, the final outcome is the same whether the initial auction is efficient or inefficient, 
and so the bidders’ expected payoffs are identical under either an efficient or inefficient initial auction. 
However, the seller loses any share of the gains from trade in the resale market, and so is best off 
adopting an efficient auction, where no resale takes place. 
In the realistic case where bidders’ values are affiliated, Milgrom and Weber (1982) proved an 
important revenue advantage of ascending auctions. The open bidding competition reveals information 
that the bidders then use in revising their estimates of value. As a result, uncertainty is reduced and so is 
the winner’s curse. Bidders can safely bid more aggressively, increasing revenues to the seller. 
A related behavioral effect is the comfort afforded the bidder in an ascending auction. The winner 
knows that others are willing to pay nearly as much. If one takes the highest bid of the others as the 
market price, then it is impossible to overbid by more than one bid increment. Indeed, at the time the final 
bid is placed, the winner knows that others are willing to pay more for the item. Raising the bid in this 
state seems especially attractive. (Of course, this reasoning is flawed, but it may be one reason bidders 
routinely fall into the trap of the winner’s curse.) In contrast, in a sealed-bid auction, overbidding is a 
serious problem, especially when one is bidding as an agent for shareholders. How does the BellSouth 
bidding team explain why its bid of $2.5 billion beat the next best bid by $1 billion? In an ascending 
auction, one can always use the bidding of the others to justify a further raise. “If it is worth $x to them, 
why is it not worth that much to us? Aren’t we a good company?” Not raising a bid is a confession of 
inferiority. 
A final revenue advantage of ascending auctions comes from budget constraints and the way they are 
established and revised. In high stake auctions, like the FCC spectrum auctions, bidding teams typically 
face budget constraints, which are negotiated with the Board of Directors (or outside investors). Boards 
are wisely skeptical of the rosy forecasts found in some business plans. Hence, without evidence to the 
contrary, Boards may tend to substitute conservative estimates and approve a more limited budget as a 
result. Under sealed bidding, the bidding team is held to this limited budget. However, in an ascending 
auction, the bidding team can return to the Board with hard and fast “evidence” supporting their 
optimistic estimates: the high bids of the other bidders confirm how much these items are worth. In this 
way, budget constraints can be relaxed. Also, a simultaneous ascending auction enables the bidders to 
spend their entire budgets; whereas, in a simultaneous sealed bid, a bidder is unable to spend its entire 
budget, due to the uncertainty of winning. 
This search for additional money was especially important in the FCC’s C-block auction. The five-
month duration of the auction gave bidders ample opportunity to seek more funds. For example, 
NextWave, the largest bidder with winning bids of $4.2 billion (41% of revenues), raised essential funds 
throughout the auction. In a letter to the Securities & Exchange Commission, on 3 February 1997, 
NextWave states, “the Company did not even have enough contingent Series B subscriptions to meet the 
FCC’s 5% deposit requirement until shortly before the close of the C-block Auction.” For NextWave and 
many of the other winners, raising additional funds during the auction was an essential element in 
winning licenses. These firms went into the auction with business plans that supported valuations of about 
$20 per person. The auction ended with the winners paying twice that.
3 
                                                      
3 The FCC has as of August 1997 collected only about 10% of this money (the initial deposit). Since the auction, the 
investment climate for wireless telephony has soured, making it impossible for the winners to make the required 
installment payments. The FCC is in the process of deciding whether to foreclose and reauction (and risk tying the 
licenses up in bankruptcy court) or to restructure the debt.   4
C.  Privacy and Implementation 
Another virtue of ascending auctions is privacy. The ascending process reveals only that the winners 
are willing to pay at least the amount bid. The upper portion of the demand curve is never expressed. 
Rothkopf et al. (1990) argue that this is one reason Vickrey’s sealed-bid is auction is so rarely used. The 
incentive to bid your true value is lost if this information is relevant to subsequent transactions. Of course, 
the seller could choose not to make the winning bids public, but this may be difficult in some settings. In 
addition, corruption is more of a problem in the Vickrey auction. After receiving the bids the seller can 
submit a fake bid for just under the amount of the highest bid. Again, steps can be taken to mitigate this 
risk, but it may be impossible to eliminate this possibility. 
An important implementation advantage of ascending auctions is that the open bidding process is 
less vulnerable to corruption than is sealed bidding. Although corruption is possible and does occur in 
ascending auctions, the open competition precludes the most frequent form of corruption in first-price 
sealed-bid auctions: leaking the high bid to a bidder who can then top it. Since in an ascending auction 
high bids are revealed to everyone, and can be topped by anyone, there is no need for secrecy. 
A second implementation advantage is that ascending auctions avoid the commitment problem 
inherent in a sealed-bid format. A sealed-bid auction may be infeasible, because the seller cannot commit 
to rejecting higher bids. In the takeover context, where the Board is obligated to do the best it can for the 
shareholders, the Board may be forced to consider higher bids (lock-ups and break-up fees are imperfect 
ways around this problem). Moreover, since takeovers are initiated by an initial bid from a buyer, it is 
difficult for the seller to orchestrate a sealed-bid auction.  
II. Why sealed bid? 
One of the traditional reasons for sealed bidding is that it avoids the need to bring the parties 
together. The bidders may be dispersed geographically and it may be too costly to get them all together 
for an ascending-bid auction. This reason is now irrelevant. Today, communication technologies have 
advanced to the point where bidders can easily participate in ascending auctions without leaving the 
comfort of their homes. The Internet is used to conduct hundreds of ascending auctions each day with 
bidders worldwide. Security and reliability issues largely have been solved.  
Simplicity is also an issue. Sealed-bid auctions would appear to be the easiest to implement. The 
seller need simply announce the form bids should take and give an address and date for bid submission. 
Again, technology has gone a long way to reducing the costs of an ascending auction for both the seller 
and the bidders.  
Difficult bid evaluation is another reason for using sealed bids. Procurement auctions are usually 
sealed bid for precisely this reason. In procurement, price is often only one dimension of a bid. The 
quality of the job may be equally important, and it may be impossible for the auctioneer to fully specify 
how bids are to be compared. Provided there is sufficient time, this does not necessarily rule out an 
ascending bid process. Certainly bid evaluation is complex in takeovers, and yet takeovers often involve 
an alternating sequence of bids, which is characteristic of ascending auctions. High-stake procurement 
also commonly involves an iterative process, where bidders are given an opportunity to improve bids in 
light of initial bids. 
A.  Ex ante asymmetries 
The efficiency of ascending auctions is not always a virtue. In particular, when there are ex ante 
asymmetries among the bidders, then an ascending auction may discourage participation by lower-valuing 
bidders. If a bidder knows that it will ultimately lose to the bidder with the highest value, then it has no 
incentive to participate. At the extreme, if all parties know which potential bidder has the highest value, 
then only this highest bidder is likely to bid in an ascending auction, and the auction ends at a price near   5
zero. The advantage of a first-price sealed-bid auction in this setting is that it eliminates this zero-price 
equilibrium. The low-valuation bidders have an incentive to participate, since in equilibrium they win 
with positive probability at favorable terms. The possibility of an inefficient assignment is precisely what 
attracts the bidders that will discipline the highest-valuing bidder. These revenue benefits of first-price 
sealed-bid auctions are studied in Maskin and Riley (1996) in a private value model.  
Klemperer (1998) considers the effect of ex ante asymmetries in an “almost” common value setting 
(see also Bulow et al. (1996)). He provides robust examples, demonstrating that in an ascending auction 
even minor asymmetries can lead to highly asymmetric equilibria that result in low revenues. In contrast, 
slight asymmetries in a first-price sealed-bid auction have only a slight effect on revenues. The intuition 
for the result comes from the winner’s curse. Suppose there are just two bidders in a common value 
setting, except one has a slight advantage. This advantage enables the bidder to bid more than its rival. 
But the rival’s response to this more aggressive bidding is to bid less. Because of the winner’s curse, the 
bids are strategic substitutes (a higher bid by one implies a lower bid by the other). The advantaged bidder 
can then increase its bid more, because of the less aggressive bidding of the rival. This multiplier effect 
can turn small asymmetries in values into large asymmetries in ascending-bid strategies and yield low 
revenues. In settings with significant participation costs, this can lead to nonparticipation by all but the 
most advantaged firm. 
If the seller knows the extent of the asymmetry, then the seller can level the playing field by giving 
disadvantaged bidders an appropriate price preference. This practice is common in government 
procurement in the U.S., where small disadvantaged businesses are often given a 10 percent price 
preference. Bidding credits of from 10 to 40 percent were used in the FCC spectrum auctions to 
encourage participation by women, minorities, and small businesses. In the regional narrowband auction, 
these preferences had the effect of stimulating competition and significantly raising revenues (Ayres and 
Cramton 1996). Of course, the government’s use of credits is crude, since rarely does it have good 
information about the extent of asymmetries among bidders. In most private auctions, even if one knew 
the extent of asymmetries, it would not be permissible to use that information to discriminate among 
bidders. 
In auctions for public resources, it is common for interested parties to comment on preliminary rules 
before the final rules are set. One way to identify situations with large asymmetries is to listen to the 
comments from bidders. Bidders with high values tend to favor ascending auctions; whereas, bidders with 
low values prefer sealed bidding. If only a single bidder is insisting on an ascending auction, then it is 
more likely that there is a large asymmetry favoring this bidder. In this case, a sealed-bid auction 
probably should be used. 
B.  Risk Aversion 
Risk aversion in private value auctions favors first-price sealed-bid auctions on revenue grounds 
(Maskin and Riley 1985). In the symmetric, risk-neutral case, both ascending-bid and sealed-bid yield the 
same revenue. When the bidders are risk averse, the strategies in an ascending auction do not change (it is 
still a dominant strategy to bid up to one’s value) so this same revenue is realized. However, in a first-
price auction the bidders bid more aggressively, since due to risk aversion, the bidders prefer a larger 
probability of winning a smaller prize. When risk aversion is coupled with large asymmetries, the revenue 
gains from sealed bidding can be large. An example is a bidder pursuing “must win” items. 
This revenue advantage of first-price auctions critically depends on the private-value assumption. In 
a private-value auction, the bidder can avoid all risk by bidding its true valuation: then win or lose the 
outcome is the same (a zero payoff). The same cannot be said in the realistic case of affiliated values. 
Then the winner’s curse implies that aggressive bidding involves real risks. Indeed, sealed bids typically 
expose the bidder to additional risk and the best response is often to bid less aggressively or not at all. 
Even in the private-values case, the analysis above ignores the risk of leaving money on the table in a   6
sealed-bid auction. This is a real risk in many auctions where the bidding team is acting as an agent and is 
rewarded based on its apparent performance. 
C.  Avoid collusion 
Perhaps the most important reason for a sealed-bid auction is the avoidance of collusion. In an 
ascending auction, deviations from collusive agreements can be punished during the auction. In a sealed-
bid auction, deviations cannot be punished in the auction. Hence, sealed bidding potentially admits a 
smaller range of collusive equilibria (Milgrom 1987). However, this distinction is often of little 
importance in practice. Most sealed-bid auctions are not one-shot deals. Rather there is typically a 
sequence of auctions, so deviations in an early auction can be punished in a later auction. Second, 
punishments can occur outside of the auction. Since collusion is illegal, there is little reason that colluders 
need be constrained by the law in devising punishment schemes. Certainly, there is a long history of 
collusion in sealed bid auctions. One cannot argue that sealed-bid auctions are immune to collusion. Even 
arguing that they are less apt to involve collusion is difficult to support with empirical evidence. 
Nonetheless, sealed bidding does have an important advantage over ascending bids with respect to 
collusion avoidance. In ascending auctions for multiple items, the dynamic bid process can serve not only 
to enforce a collusive arrangement but also to identify one. In a simultaneous ascending auction for 
multiple items, the bidders can effectively use their bids to negotiate a division of the items. In a 
competitive auction, price is used as the assignment device. Bidders with lower valuations drop out in 
response to the higher prices. However, all bidders prefer a situation where prices remain low. A 
simultaneous ascending auction can offer a rich language to communicate preferences and threats, which 
can serve to identify a satisfactory split at low prices and then enforce it. 
Ausubel and Cramton (1997) demonstrate how ascending auctions tend to expand the set of 
equilibria in both positive and negative directions. Whether the goal is efficiency or revenue 
maximization, the seller may be better or worse off with an ascending auction design, depending on how 
effective the bidders are at using the rich bid strategies to coordinate on low-price equilibria. With full-
information, it is a simple matter to construct examples of zero-price equilibria. Private information 
complicates the “negotiation,” but even in this case zero-price and low-price equilibria often exist.  
Not all ascending auctions give the bidders the same ability to identify and enforce collusive 
arrangements. An important design decision then when using an ascending auction is how much 
information to reveal to bidders and what restrictions to place on bids. This decision is fundamental to the 
tradeoff between efficient information revelation and the potential for collusive outcomes. At one extreme 
are the FCC spectrum auctions, which to date have revealed all bids and bidder information and have 
imposed few restrictions on bids. At the other extreme is an auction that just reports high bids and 
restricts new bids to be exactly one increment higher. An ideal auction attempts to allow information that 
facilities a competitive process (e.g., the reporting of high bids), but limits information that is more apt to 
support collusion. This issue will be addressed in the next section. 
III.  Ascending Auctions for Multiple Items 
In this section, I discuss the many different ways that ascending auctions can be implemented when 
selling multiple items. Even in the case of a single item, what is meant by an ascending auction needs to 
be clarified. The standard ascending auction for a single item is the English auction in which the standing 
high bid is posted and the auctioneer asks for improvements from the floor. The auctioneer exercises 
discretion in setting bid increments and in recognizing bidders. A variant is the ascending clock auction, 
in which a continuous or discrete clock indicates the standing high bid and the bidders press a button to 
exit from the competition. Typically, the number of remaining bidders is posted with the standing high 
bid. I first consider how these ascending auctions are implemented when selling identical items, like 
electricity or Treasury debt. Then I consider interdependent items, like the FCC spectrum licenses.   7
A.  Identical items 
Multi-unit ascending auctions can be conducted in two basic ways: with demand schedules or with 
an ascending clock. 
With the demand schedule approach, bidders submit a demand schedule in each round. The 
schedules are aggregated to form the demand curve. Typically, demand schedules are required to be step 
functions, but piecewise linear schedules are permitted in some settings. A sample demand curve appears 
in Figure 1. The clearing price where demand intersects supply defines the tentative split between 
winning and losing bids. If this were the final round, those bids above the clearing price would be filled, 
those at the clearing price would be rationed, and those below the clearing price would be rejected. 












To promote reliable price discovery an activity rule is needed. The activity rule prevents bidders 
from holding back initially and then submitting large bids after the other bidders have revealed their 
information. In most situations, the bidders will have (weakly) downward sloping demand curves. In this 
case, a simple yet powerful rule can be used without distorting behavior. The rule has two elements: 
1.  All bids must be entered in the initial round (that is, the total quantity that a bidder bids for 
cannot increase). 
2.  Any losing bid that is not improved in the next round is permanently rejected. The improvement 
must exceed the clearing price by at least the minimum bid increment. 
This activity rule is the one-sided variant of a rule proposed by Wilson (1997) for the California 
Power Exchange’s day-ahead electricity auction. The rule is based on the concept of revealed preference. 
Bidders are required to improve losing bids at the first opportunity. A failure to improve a losing bid is 
taken as presumptive evidence that the bidder’s valuation is below the minimum bid (one increment 
above the prior clearing price). In this one-sided setting, prices only increase, so the unimproved bid can 
be permanently rejected. 
The activity rule forces the bidders to bid in a way that is consistent with a downward sloping 
demand curve. A competitive process results in which winning bids get topped by losing bids. The 
process repeats until the clearing price reaches a point where a sufficient number of bidders find it 
sufficiently unattractive that excess demand falls to zero. At this point there is no further pressure to 
improve bids and the auction ends.   8
Two alternative pricing rules are commonly used: uniform pricing and pay-your-bid pricing. With 
uniform pricing all the winning bidders pay the final clearing price. Uniform pricing has the advantage 
that everyone pays the same price. Under pay-your-bid pricing, each winning bidder pays the price bid. In 
a sealed-bid design, the distinction between uniform and pay-your-bid pricing is large. In an ascending 
auction, the distinction is much less important, since winning bids under pay-your-bid pricing are apt to 
be close to the final clearing price in equilibrium. The reason is that a bidder has little incentive to raise 
the bid much more than one bid increment above the clearing price. Hence, pay-your-bid pricing shares 
the main advantage of uniform pricing.  
Pay-your-bid pricing does have an important advantage over uniform pricing in an ascending 
auction. With uniform pricing, the bidders can submit bid schedules that create strong incentives for the 
other bidders to reduce demand. In particular, they can bid in such a way that the demand curve is quite 
steep above the clearing price. Faced with this steep curve, it is a best response for bidders to drop their 
losing bids, rather than continue to bid a large quantity, which would result in much higher prices. This is 
similar to the problem with uniform pricing in static auctions emphasized by Wilson (1979) and Back and 
Zender (1993), but here the problem is magnified, since the ascending process gives the bidders the 
opportunity to coordinate on a low-price equilibrium. For this reason, pay-your-bid pricing should be 
preferred in ascending auctions. 
Better still is the ascending clock auction. The clock indicates the current price. In each round, the 
bidders submit the quantity they are willing to buy at that price. If the total quantity bid exceeds the 
quantity available the clock is increased. The bidding continues until the quantity bid is less than the 
quantity available. The good is then allocated at the prior price, and is rationed for those that reduced their 
quantity in the last round.
4 The activity rule in this case is simply that each bidder cannot increase its 
quantity as prices rise. 
This design shares all the advantages of the pay-your-bid auction, and has several additional 
advantages: 
1.  It is easier to implement for both seller and buyers, since a buyer only bids a single quantity in 
each round, rather than a schedule. 
2.  There is no possibility of undesirable bid signaling, since only the total quantity bid is reported.  
3.  It avoids the mechanism for collusion under uniform pricing, yet yields a single market-clearing 
price. 
A difficulty with all the approaches described above is that they are inefficient (Ausubel and 
Cramton 1996). In each case, bidders shade their bids in order to keep the price down. Large bidders tend 
to shade more than small bidders, since a particular price effect has a bigger impact on profits for a large 
bidder. This differential shading leads to an inefficient outcome. Large bidders win too little and small 
bidders win too much. 
Ausubel (1997) proposes an alternative ascending clock auction that achieves efficiency. In the 
Ausubel auction, items are awarded when they are “clinched” and the price paid is the amount on the 
clock at the time of clinching. An item is clinched when it becomes mathematically impossible for the 
bidder not to win the item (that is, excess demand would fall to zero before the bidder could reduce its 
demand to zero). This pricing rule implements Vickrey (1961) pricing in an ascending format. Efficiency 
is restored without losing the advantages of an ascending-bid format. 
                                                      
4 The closing rule can also use bisection to hit the clearing price more closely: increase price if there is excess 
demand; decrease price if there is excess supply; each price step bisects the highest price with excess demand and 
the lowest price with excess supply.   9
B.  Interdependent items 
A more difficult auction is the sale of many interdependent items. In this case, a bidder cares about 
the package of items it wins. Some items are substitutes and others are complements. The value attached 
to any particular item depends on which other items are won. The FCC spectrum auctions are an example. 
In spectrum auctions, there are often synergies from buying licenses that are adjacent (either in frequency 
or geography).
5 
The theory of auctions in this setting is not well developed. Nonetheless, it is known that when 
complementarities are not too strong, a simultaneous ascending auction works well in practice. McAfee, 
Milgrom, and Wilson proposed this auction design for the FCC spectrum auctions. It has been used 
successfully in spectrum auctions in the U.S., Mexico, and Australia. 
In a simultaneous ascending auction, all items are on the block at the same time. In every round, a 
bidder can bid on any of the items. The auction does not close until bidding has ceased on all items; that 
is, until a round goes by in which there are no new bids on any of the items. 
There are three critical features of this method. First, the ascending-bid design allows the bidders to 
react to information revealed in prior rounds. This reduces the winner’s curse, enabling the bidders to bid 
more aggressively. Second, by auctioning all the items simultaneously, bidders are able to react to prices 
across items. Since bidder valuations depend on the collection of items held, providing this price 
information on related items is essential to the formation of efficient packages of items. The simultaneous 
sale of related items in an ascending auction gives the bidders the flexibility they need to express these 
value interdependencies. In addition it assures that similar items sell for similar prices. Third, keeping the 
bidding open on all items until there are no new bids gives the bidders flexibility in switching among 
various packages as prices change. 
The success of these auctions is documented in Cramton (1995, 1997), McAfee and McMillan 
(1996), and Milgrom (1998). Overall, the auctions have performed well on both efficiency and revenue 
grounds. However, in some of the auctions, especially those with more limited competition, it appears 
that some revenues have been lost due to strategic demand reduction or undesirable bid signaling. 
Little can be done to prevent demand reduction in this setting without introducing other 
inefficiencies. For example, Klemperer’s (1997) proposal to use an ascending auction to identify the top-
two bidders and then have a sealed-bid auction to identify the winner would work well if there were no 
value interdependencies. But with these interdependencies and the importance of budget constraints, the 
outcome might be quite inefficient, if the final packages have a more random structure. Of course, if 
resale is efficient then this is not a problem, but there is little reason to expect that resale costs would be 
slight. 
In contrast, undesirable bid signaling can be eliminated by imposing restrictions on the bids and 
limiting the information provided between rounds. First, bids can be limited to three significant digits. In 
the FCC spectrum auctions, there are hundreds of cases of bidders using the trailing digits of bids to 
signal to other bidders. This “code bidding”, although usually ineffective, sometimes helps bidders 
negotiate a split of the items at low prices. The codes can indicate either how the items should be split up 
or what the punishment will be in the event a particular suggestion is ignored. In settings where bidder 
collusion is especially a problem, a second step can be taken: only announce the standing high bids, rather 
than both the bids and the bidders’ identities. Without observing the bidder identities, it is impossible for 
the bidders to propose and enforce a division of the items without direct (and illegal) communication. 
                                                      
5 See Ausubel et al. (1997) and Moreton and Spiller (1998).   10
IV.  Conclusion 
Neither the theory nor the empirics are sufficient to conclude ascending auctions are superior to 
sealed-bid auctions. However, the case for ascending auctions is strong. The dynamic price discovery 
process of an ascending auction simply does a better job of answering the basic auction question: who 
should get the items and at what prices? Ascending auctions perform well on both efficiency and revenue 
grounds across a variety of settings. Two factors may favor sealed bidding – ex ante asymmetries and 
weak competition. In other cases, an ascending auction design is probably best. However, steps should be 
taken to limit the possibility of collusive outcomes in an ascending auction. This is accomplished by 
setting reserves, by imposing bid restrictions, and by limiting the information bidders receive during the 
auction. 
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